

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 303013
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AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
TREASURY PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 303013

E.O. 11652:YGDS-2

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 467 - DECEMBER 20, 1977
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LONDON FOR KINSOLVING
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OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

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PROPOSALS FOR HOME RULE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAS GENERALLY BEEN NEGATIVE. ARAB COMMENTATORS HAVE COMPLAINED THAT BEGIN'S PLAN FAILS TO DEAL WITH THE NEARLY 2 MILLION PALESTINIAN REFUGEES LIVING OUTSIDE OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE ARAB PRESS HAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE PLAN WOULD CONTINUE AN ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK AND ISRAELI CONTROL OVER EAST JERUSALEM.

2. REACTION IN EGYPT WAS CAUTIOUS. AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN SAID EGYPT'S FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE PROPOSAL DID NOT TALLY WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT'S CONCEPT OF A SETTLEMENT. SOME EGYPTIAN PRESS REPORTS INDICATED OPPOSITION TO A CONTINUED ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE PLAN DOES NOT GIVE

THE WEST BANK ENTITY MORE ATTRIBUTES OF A SOVEREIGN STATE. OTHER PRESS REPORTS SAID EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS WERE PRIVATELY OPTIMISTIC THAT BEGIN'S PROPOSALS COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR TALKS WITH SADAT ON SUNDAY.

3. THE STATE-OWNED RADIO STATION IN SAUDI ARABIA SAID BEGIN'S PROPOSALS WERE INADEQUATE. IT REJECTED CONTINUED ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST JERUSALEM AND SAID "THERE IS NO ROOM FOR OPTIMISM."

4. IN SYRIA, THE STATE RADIO STATION REJECTED BEGIN'S
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PLAN, AND CLAIMED IT "RETAINS ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION...AND IGNORES THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS."

5. JORDAN'S MINISTER OF INFORMATION ANNOUNCED THAT THE PROPOSAL, AS STATED BY BEGIN ON US TELEVISION, CONSTITUTES AN ATTEMPT TO PERPETUATE THE OCCUPATION, NOT TO END IT. THE SEMIOFFICIAL JORDANIAN NEWSPAPER AL-DUSTUR SAID THE PROPOSAL FELL SHORT OF WHAT THE ARABS WANTED, BUT IT FOUND SOME CONSOLATION IN THE FACT THAT BEGIN'S IDEAS WERE NOT FINAL AND WERE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION WITH SADAT.

6. ALL THE MAJOR WEST BANK LEADERS REJECTED THE PLAN AS INSUFFICIENT. WEST BANK LEADERS SYMPATHETIC TO THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION REJECTED THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND TROOPS ON THE WEST BANK. MODERATE LEADERS LIKE BETHLEHEM MAYOR FRAYJ HOPED THERE WOULD BE MORE TO THE PLAN THAN THE DETAILS RELEASED BY BEGIN, "BUT IF THAT'S ALL THERE IS WE REJECT IT ENTIRELY." MOST MODERATE WEST BANKERS AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT ON THE WEST BANK MUST INCLUDE:

(A) COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITH ONLY MINOR EXCEPTIONS;

(B) A TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION; AND

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7. THERE HAS BEEN NO IMMEDIATE REACTION FROM HIGH-LEVEL PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS. THE HEAD OF THE PLO INFORMATION BUREAU IN BEIRUT, HOWEVER, DESCRIBED THE BEGIN PROPOSAL AS "UNACCEPTABLE" BECAUSE IT REJECTED "THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE TO FORM THEIR OWN STATE UNDER PLO LEADERSHIP," AND WAS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF "ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP."

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8. THE LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTRY PUBLISHED A STATEMENT ATTACKING BEGIN'S PROPOSALS AS A PLOT TO "LIQUIDATE THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION."

9. ALGERIA CALLED, IN A BROADCAST OVER ALGIERS RADIO, FOR SADAT'S RESIGNATION IN LIGHT OF BEGIN'S PROPOSALS, WHICH IT DESCRIBED AS INADEQUATE.

10. AN OFFICIAL NORTH YEMENI STATEMENT LABELED THE PROPOSALS "NEW OBSTACLES TO PEACE." (CONFIDENTIAL)

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12. IN CONTRAST, MEANWHILE, A GUSH EMUNIM SYMPATHIZER TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT THE GUSH WAS IN A STATE OF "SHOCK AND CONFUSION" AS A RESULT OF REPORTS THAT BEGIN HAS PROPOSED WEST BANK CONCESSIONS. HOWEVER, HE WARNED THAT THE TEMPORARY QUIESCENCE OF THE GUSH SHOULD NOT BE EQUATED WITH A DIMINUTION OF THE COMMITMENT OF GUSH ACTIVISTS.

13. HAARETZ REPORTED THAT SUPPORT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS HAS DROPPED FROM 68 TO 52

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PERCENT SINCE THE SADAT VISIT, ACCORDING TO A PORI POLL. FURTHERMORE, THE PERCENTAGE OF ISRAELIS OPPOSED TO SETTLEMENTS INCREASED TO 40.5 FROM 20 PERCENT PRIOR TO THE VISIT. HOWEVER, EMBASSY TEL AVIV LEARNED FROM JEWISH AGENCY SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR RAVID THAT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING AS PLANNED, DESPITE REPORTS OF A SUSPENSION SINCE THE SADAT INITIATIVE, AND ALL SETTLEMENTS APPROVED BY THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WOULD PROCEED ON SCHEDULE.

14. DESPITE CONTINUING ARAB-ISRAELI CONTACTS -- OR PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THEM -- ISRAELI DOVE ARYE ELIAU TOLD EMBASSY TEL AVIV THAT TALKS BETWEEN THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE PEACE COUNCIL (IPC) AND PLO MODERATES HAVE REACHED A DEAD END. ELIAU SAID THAT, WHILE HE WOULD CONTINUE PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH SARTAWI AND JIRYIS, HE NO LONGER HAD ANY EXPECTATION OF USEFUL RESULTS FROM THEM. (CONFIDENTIAL)

15. USSR. THE SOVIET UNION ON THE PUBLIC FRONT SEEMS TO BE MARKING TIME WITH REGARD TO THE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING EVENTS SURROUNDING THE SADAT-BEGIN DIALOGUE. SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND US SUPPORT FOR IT BUT AT REDUCED INTENSITY AND AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. CONCURRENTLY, MOSCOW ALSO CONTINUES TO REACT WITH SURPRISING PUBLIC EQUANIMITY TO SADAT'S SUSTAINED ATTACKS ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND HIS ADDITIONAL MOVES TO REDUCE ITS INFLUENCE IN EGYPT.

16. MOSCOW'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH EVIDENTLY REFLECTS ITS ASSESSMENT THAT, AT THIS STAGE, SOVIET LONG-TERM INTERESTS ARE STILL BEST SERVED BY A COURSE DESIGNED TO KEEP US-ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FEET TO THE FIRE ON THE COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND EVENTUAL RETURN TO GENEVA AND TO PRESERVE THE SOVIET ABILITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WHATEVER EMERGES FROM CAIRO AND FURTHER SADAT-BEGIN TALKS.

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S E C R E T STATE 303013

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 303013 ACTION SINAI INFO ABUDHABI
ALGIERS DOHA JERUSALEM KUWAIT LONDON MANAMA MOSCOW MUSCAT
NOUAKCHOTT PARIS RABAT TEHRAN TRIPLOI TUNIS TREASURY DEC 20

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SECRET

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